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Case No. 20070392-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Eddie G. Kucharski, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for communications fraud. This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, where defendant was represented by counsel during 
the plea proceedings, repeatedly informed the court that his plea was knowing and 
voluntary, and has not brought forward any additional evidence establishing that 
his plea was involuntary? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while its findings of fact are only overturned 
if clearly erroneous. State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42,1f 7,140 P.3d 1288. Moreover, the 
"ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional 
and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness/' State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ]f 10, 983 P.2d 556. 
2. Did the trial court err when it failed to rule on defendant's objections to the 
PSI prior to sentencing? 
Standard of Review. "Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal 
duty is a question of law that we review for correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, 
1 13, 6 P.3d 1133. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004): 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1 (West 2004): 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation 
report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented 
by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working 
days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and 
the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of 
the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten 
working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the 
department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and 
accuracy on the record. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 18, 2004, defendant was charged with one count of 
communications fraud, a second degree felony. R. 1. The court scheduled a jury 
trial for October 25, 2005. R. 17. On the morning of trial, however, defendant 
appeared and entered a plea of no contest to third-degree communications fraud. R. 
27. In exchange for his plea, the State agreed that it would not recommend 
incarceration. R. 30. 
Defendant did not appear for his original sentencing hearing. R. 33. An 
arrest warrant was issued, and defendant was arrested in North Carolina in 
September 2006. R. 71. 
Defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that his 
plea was involuntarily entered due to his counsel's failure to subpoena certain 
witnesses prior to trial. R. 97-101. The trial court held a hearing on that motion on 
October 19, 2006, and heard testimony from both defendant and his prior counsel. 
R. 117-18; 208:14-57. Following argument, the court denied defendant's motion and 
scheduled a sentencing hearing. R. 208: 57-59. 
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AP&P submitted a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI) on February 16, 
2007. * Defendant filed an objection to the PSI shortly thereafter, complaining of 17 
alleged deficiencies in that report. R. 138-48 (Attachment A). On March 5, 2007, 
AP&P filed an itemized response to defendant's 17 objections. See generally R. 223.2 
In that response, AP&P agreed to make three of the changes suggested by 
defendant. AP&P accordingly submitted an Amended PSI that incorporated the 
requested changes. See generally AP&P Response (Attachment B); Amended PSI. 
But AP&P disputed the validity of defendant's remaining 14 objections. AP&P 
Response: 1-2. 
Defendant again failed to appear for sentencing, so sentencing was postponed 
until defendant could be located. R. 149. On April 12, 2007, defendant was 
sentenced. R. 158. At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court 
acknowledged that it had reviewed both defendant's objection to the PSI and 
AP&P's response. R. 208: 76. But the court did not enter any findings on the record 
1
 This PSI is located in a non-paginated manila folder in the record. For clarity 
purposes, this manila folder has a heading stating: "State v. Kucharski, PSI Report." 
2
 AP&P's response and the amended PSI were not originally contained in the 
record, but were added pursuant to the State's motion to supplement the record. 
The two documents are stapled together in a manila folder that is paginated as R. 
223. The documents are not individually paginated, however, so the State will cite 
to them as AP&P Response: (page number) and Amended PSI: (page number). 
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regarding defendant's objections to the PSL R. 208: 76-81. Following argument 
from counsel and a statement from defendant, the court sentenced defendant to 0-5 
years in prison and ordered restitution. R. 158-59; 208: 80-81. Defendant now 
appeals. R. 175-76. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant claims that his guilty plea was involuntary because his 
trial counsel failed to subpoena certain witnesses prior to trial. This claim should be 
rejected. Contrary to defendant's claim, the record does not show that his counsel 
failed to subpoena witnesses who would have assisted him at trial. Instead, the 
record shows that defendant's trial counsel did not subpoena the requested 
witnesses because he learned that they would not help defendant's case. 
In any event, defendant has not shown that this alleged failure rendered his 
plea involuntary. As noted by the trial court below, defendant repeatedly informed 
the court that he was entering his plea voluntarily, both during the plea colloquy 
and in the plea statement. Moreover, defendant was represented by counsel during 
this process, and defendant's counsel specifically concurred with defendant's 
attestations that the plea was voluntary. Given this, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
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Defendant also suggests that the trial court improperly analyzed his motion 
using an objective, rather than subjective, standard. Although the trial court did use 
the terms incorrectly, the record plainly shows that the court properly focused on 
defendant's subjective understanding at the time of the plea. The trial court 
therefore did not err. 
Point II: Defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing to rule on 
his objections to the PSI. Although the State does not concede that defendant's 
objections have any merit, Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-l(6)(a) (West 2004) does 
require a trial court to rule on a defendant's PSI objections prior to sentencing. The 
trial court did not enter any such findings in this case, and this Court should 
accordingly remand this case to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing 
the trial court to rule on defendant's objections to the PSI. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Aplt. Br. 10-14. Defendant claims that the denial was 
incorrect for two reasons. First, defendant claims that his plea was involuntary 
because his trial counsel failed to subpoena certain witnesses. Aplt. Br. 10-14. 
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Second, defendant claims that the trial court improperly evaluated his guilty plea 
using an objective, not subjective, standard. Aplt. Br. 10-14. Both claims should be 
rejected. 
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that 
defendant's plea was voluntarily entered. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 
withdraw his plea. According to defendant, the court first erred when it"failed to 
consider unrefutted testimony that appointed trial counsel did not talk with and 
thereby subpoena defense witnesses prior to the scheduled trial/' Aplt. Br. 14. 
Defendant next claims that this alleged failure rendered his plea involuntary. 
Defendant is incorrect on both fronts. 
First, the record conclusively shows that the trial court was correct when it 
rejected defendant's claim that his trial counsel had failed to subpoena witnesses 
that would have been helpful to defendant's case. 
After defendant filed this motion below, the trial court held a hearing to 
determine whether the plea was the result of his counsel's failure to contact 
witnesses. R. 97-101,117-18. Mark Arrington, who was defendant's counsel at the 
time of the plea, testified at that hearing. R. 208: 29-38. Arrington explained that 
defendant had provided him with a list of potential witnesses who defendant said 
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would support his defense. R. 208:30. When Arrington contacted those witnesses, 
however, they did not support defendant's story: "In other words, the witness's 
names that he was giving me that stated they would support his claim were actually 
contradicting that claim, and would testify differently at trial." R. 208: 30. 
According to Arrington, that was the "foremost reason why I didn't subpoena 
anybody" to testify at trial. R. 208: 31. 
Defendant testified in response. Defendant disagreed with Arrington's 
testimony, and he then suggested that Arrington had also performed deficiently by 
failing to locate one of the key witnesses. R. 208: 38-39. Arrington subsequently 
returned to the stand and rebutted that assertion. Arrington explained that he made 
an attempt "to contact all of the individuals that had been referred" to him by the 
defendant. R. 208:45. He further explained that although he could not "get a hold 
of all those individuals," this was not the result of a lack of effort. R. 208: 45. 
Specifically, Arrington "called their telephone numbers and followed up any leads," 
and he then "tried to locate them" if he discovered that they had "moved or 
changed numbers," R. 208: 45. Defendant did not refute this testimony. 
The trial court did not issue a ruling expressly addressing the conflicting 
testimony on this question. But the trial court at least implicitly accepted 
Arrington's testimony when it denied defendant's motion. Specifically, although 
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defendant testified that his plea was a result of his counsel's inaction, the trial court 
concluded that there was no "basis . . . either in the testimony or in the videotape or 
in the record" to indicate that the plea was involuntary. R. 208: 58 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the trial court did not accept defendant's claims that his plea was the 
result of his counsel's performance. 
At the very least, however, the record negates defendant's claim that there 
was "unrefutted testimony" that trial counsel had failed to talk to his "defense 
witnesses prior to the scheduled trial." Aplt. Br. 14. Instead, the record shows that 
defense counsel contacted the potential witnesses, but then chose not to subpoena 
them only after learning that they would not support defendant's story. 
Defendant's involuntariness claim is therefore based on a false factual predicate. It 
should be rejected on this basis alone. 
Second, even if defendant's factual claim were true, defendant still has not 
shown that his counsel's alleged failure rendered his plea involuntary. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004), a guilty plea can only be 
withdrawn if it was unknowingly or involuntarily entered. This standard requires 
that a defendant receive "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the 
first and most universally recognized requirement of due process." Salazar v. 
Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). Moreover, a defendant must also be 
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informed of "the direct consequences of [his] guilty plea/' State v. Marshall, 2003 UT 
App 381,f 21 n. 9, 81 P.3d 775 (quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted); accord 
State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT App 538, \ 8,127 P.3d 1252. 
When evaluating such claims, it is well settled that a trial court's rule 11 
compliance creates a presumption that the plea was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily. See State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, \ 22, 26 P.3d 203; State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44, If 11,1 P.3d 1108. In State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1992), for 
example, the defendant likewise claimed that his plea was the result of "coercion by 
his attorney." Id. at 747. Before considering the merits of the claim, this Court first 
noted that the defendant had not "claim[ed] the trial court did not strictly follow 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in the plea proceeding." Id. at 748. 
As a result, this Court presumed that "the plea was entered voluntarily." Id. 
In this case, the defendant has not claimed that the trial court failed to comply 
with rule 11 prior to accepting his plea. Thus, this Court must presume that the plea 
was knowing and voluntary. 
Turning to the merits, defendant simply has not overcome the rule 11-based 
presumption that his plea was voluntarily entered. When a defendant claims that a 
plea was unknowing and involuntary, a "court considering such a claim is not 
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limited to the record of the plea hearing/' but instead examines the record as a 
whole. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. 
In evaluating such claims, Utah courts have repeatedly relied on a 
defendant's assertions at the plea hearing as a basis for rejecting a post-plea claim 
that the plea was unknowing or involuntary. In Thorup, for example, this Court 
held that when a "plea is entered in the presence of counsel, following the execution 
and review by the court of an affidavit which meets the requirements of Rule 11 and 
where the defendant, both in affidavit and in colloquy with the court, denies the 
plea was a result of threats, promises, or coercion, there is persuasive evidence the 
plea was voluntary." Thorup, 841 P.2d at 748. 
In Gamblin, the supreme court rejected a similar claim because the defendant 
had "stated that he understood the trial court was not bound by the conditions of 
the plea agreement, that he had read and understood his statement, and that he had 
an opportunity to ask his attorney questions regarding his statement and those 
questions were answered to his satisfaction." 2000 UT 44,114. The supreme court 
therefore affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the defendant's "conduct in 
Court as well as on the stand, supports a finding" that the plea was knowingly 
entered. Id. at If If 14. 
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As in Thorup and Gamblin, defendant in this case repeatedly informed the 
court that his plea was voluntary. In defendant's sworn plea statement, he 
specifically stated that he had received a copy of the information and understood 
the "nature and elements of crime(s) to which" he was pleading guilty. R. 28. He 
also stated that he understood that "by pleading guilty [he] will be admitting that 
[he] committed the crimes listed above," and that he was "entering this plea of my 
own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influence of any kind have 
been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this 
statement have been made to me." R. 28, 31. Defendant stated that he was "of 
sound and discerning mind" and "mentally capable of understanding these 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea." R. 31. 
Given the nature of this appeal, it is particularly significant that defendant's 
statement also contained a clear acknowledgement of his right to counsel. 
Defendant confirmed that he was represented by Mark Arrington, and he then 
stated that he and Arrington had "fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the 
consequences of my guilty plea." R. 29. Defendant also stated that he knew "that if 
I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to and I would be able to 
obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those witnesses!' R. 29 
(emphasis added). Defendant further stated that he knew that if he "could not 
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afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs/' R. 29. 
Finally, defendant stated that he was "satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney." R. 31. 
The trial court discussed this statement with defendant at the change of plea 
hearing. R. 208: 3-4. The trial court asked defendant whether he had read the 
statement; defendant answered in the affirmative. R. 208: 4. The trial court asked 
defendant whether he understood what it said; defendant answered in the 
affirmative. R. 208: 4. The trial court asked defendant whether this was the plea 
that defendant wished to enter; defendant answered in the affirmative. R. 208: 4. 
The trial court asked whether defendant had any questions that he wanted the court 
to answer prior to the plea; defendant answered that he did not have any such 
questions. R. 208:4. The trial court then asked for a plea, and defendant answered: 
"no contest." R. 208:4. The trial court then accepted that plea and found that it was 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. R. 208: 4-5. 
Before the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw, the trial court 
"reviewed the statement in advance of plea as well as the videotape of" the plea 
hearing. R. 208: 47. As discussed above, the trial court also heard testimony from 
defendant and his original attorney. The court then concluded that, based on the 
statement and the colloquy, defendant's plea was voluntarily entered. After noting 
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that there was no evidence of "concern[ ] and nervousness" in the videotape of the 
plea hearing, R. 208: 48, the court found no "basis . . . in the testimony or in the 
videotape or in the record to indicate that this wasn't knowing, voluntarily, and 
knowingly made." R. 208: 58. 
When evaluating a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea, "a defendant must 
be bound to the answers he provides during a plea colloquy." Ramos v. Rogers, 170 
F.3d 560,566 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, "[wjhere the court has scrupulously followed the 
required procedure, the defendant is bound by his statements in response to that 
court's inquiry." Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85,90 (6th Cir. 1985) (quotations and 
citation omitted). In this case, defendant did not raise any issue with respect to his 
counsel's representation prior to entering his plea, nor did he ever claim that he was 
being coerced due to his counsel's failure to subpoena any witnesses. Instead, 
defendant repeatedly informed the court that he was satisfied with the 
representation offered by his counsel, and that he therefore wanted to enter this 
plea. 
Thus, as in Thorup, defendant's plea was "entered in the presence of counsel, 
following the execution and review by the court of an affidavit which meets the 
requirements of Rule 11," and "the defendant, both in affidavit and in colloquy with 
the court, denie[d] the plea was a result of threats, promises, or coercion." 841 P.2d 
14 
at 748. Given this, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
B. The trial court used the proper standard when it evaluated 
defendant's guilty plea. 
Defendant also suggests that the trial court erred by employing a "purely 
objective standard" when it ruled on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
Aplt. Br. 14. This claim is incorrect. 
The difference between an objective standard and a subjective standard is 
plain. Under an objective standard, a court evaluates "conduct and perceptions 
external to a particular person." Black's Law Dictionary Standard (8th ed. 2004). 
This commonly involves an analysis of what a "reasonable person" would do 
and "does not require a determination of what the defendant was thinking." Id. 
By contrast, a subjective standard is "peculiar to a particular person and based 
on the person's individual views and experiences." Id. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004), a guilty plea can only 
be withdrawn "upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made." Under this statute, the inquiry is not whether an 
abstract defendant would have knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea; rather, 
the inquiry is whether this defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered this 
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particular plea. Thus, the test is subjective, not objective. See generally State v. 
Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333, K1f 12-13, 79 P.3d 960. 
During the motion hearing, the trial court nevertheless raised the question of 
whether this analysis was objective or subjective. R. 208: 47. As noted by 
defendant, Aplt. Br. 14, the trial court ultimately rejected what it referred to as a 
"subjective" approach to such motions. R. 208: 57-58. When evaluating trial court 
rulings, however, Utah's appellate courts examine the substance of the ruling, not 
the particular labeling that was used below. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. 
Co., 2007 UT 28,1j 22,158 P.3d 1088 ("Such an exalting of form over substance, while 
not unknown in our caselaw, is to be avoided when possible."); Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 
2002 UT 36,1f 28, 48 P.3d 218 ("'[I]t is the substance, not the labeling, of a motion 
that is dispositive in determining the character of the motion/" (Citation omitted.)). 
In this case, although the trial court stated that it was applying an objective 
standard, the record plainly shows that the trial court correctly analyzed 
defendant's motion on a subjective basis. 
During the plea colloquy, defendant claimed that his plea was voluntary. In 
his post-plea motion to withdraw, however, defendant claimed that the plea was 
actually involuntary. R. 97-101. During the motion hearing, the trial court raised 
the issue of whether it was obligated to believe defendant's post-plea attestations 
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that the plea was involuntary, or whether it could instead choose to believe 
defendant's pre-plea attestations that he was voluntarily entering his plea. R. 208: 
47. 
Thus, when considering the possibility of a "subjective standard," the court 
explained that it was referring to the idea that a defendant could "come back" after 
a plea had already been accepted and "say, 'Well, Judge, despite that, that wasn't 
true.'" R. 208: 58. When the court decided to reject this "subjective" standard, the 
court only rejected the suggestion that it was required to allow a defendant to 
withdraw a plea if the defendant "later[,] after the fact says, 'Judge, what I told you 
was a lie and I really didn't mean it.'" R. 208: 58. 
Rather than embracing what the court labeled as a "subjective standard," the 
court instead concluded that it could rely on defendant's earlier statements that the 
plea was knowing and voluntary over his subsequent assertions to the contrary. 
The court therefore concluded that when a "judge . . . asks these questions" and 
"goes through what the judge is supposed to go through with this form of plea 
affidavit that we have, and gets statements from the defendant," the court later has 
the right to rely on those statements in denying a motion to withdraw the plea. R. 
208:58. Thus, although the court used the labels incorrectly, the court still correctly 
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understood that the substantive question is what this particular defendant 
understood at the time of the plea. 
When applied to this case, the court clearly concluded that defendant had 
understood the nature of his plea. Prior to denying the motion to withdraw, the 
court reviewed the video of the plea colloquy, reviewed defendant's statement in 
support of his plea, and heard testimony at a motion hearing that was focused on 
this defendant's actual plea. After reviewing this case-specific evidence, the court 
ruled that it did not "find a basis both either in the testimony or in the videotape or 
in the record to indicate that this wasn't knowing, voluntarily, and knowingly 
made." R. 208: 58 (emphasis added). 
The trial court therefore properly concluded that defendant had voluntarily 
entered his plea. Defendant's claim to the contrary should be rejected. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT TO 
RESOLVE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PSI 
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing to resolve his 
objections to the PSI. Aplt. Br. 15-17. Although the State concedes that the trial 
court did not comply with its obligations under Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-
1(6)(a) (West 2004) and that remand is necessary, the remand should be limited to 
those objections that are properly at issue. 
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A, The trial court failed to comply with its obligations under Utah 
Code Annotated § 77-18-1 (6)(a). 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1 (6) (a), a trial court has an obligation to 
resolve "any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report/' In order 
to comply with this requirement, a trial court must "'consider the party's objections 
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the information objected to 
is accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is relevant to the 
issue of sentencing.'" State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 14, 6 P.3d 1133 (quoting State v. 
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 44, 973 P.2d 404). This obligation is not satisfied by "general 
statements 'concerning the court's view of the defendant and the case.'" Veteto, 2000 
UT 62, H 14 (quoting Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 44); see also State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 
206, t | 25-29, 94 R3d 295. 
Although the trial court is obligated to resolve any alleged inaccuracies in the 
PSI, it is not necessarily required to hold a hearing on the issue. As explained in 
Veteto, the trial court "may hold an additional hearing if required by the 
circumstances," but it is also entitled to "simply enter the necessary findings upon 
the record where the contested issues were presented to the court and considered at 
the sentencing hearing." Veteto, 2000 UT 62, If 15. 
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In this case, defendant filed an objection to the presentence report prior to 
sentencing. R. 138-48. In that objection, defendant listed 17 alleged errors in the 
presentence report. R. 138-48. In response, AP&P submitted a responsive letter and 
an amended PSI. R. 223. As explained in that letter, AP&P actually adopted 
defendant's suggested changes with respect to three of the 17 objections, but AP&P 
contested defendant's remaining 14 objections. R. 223:1-2. 
While the trial court clearly acknowledged defendant's objection and AP&P's 
response, R. 208: 72, 76, the court never complied with § 77-18-1 (6)(a) by entering 
findings on the record regarding the accuracy of the PSI, nor did it ever state on the 
record whether the information was relevant to sentencing. See Veteto, 2000 UT 62, \ 
14. The State accordingly agrees that remand is required in order to resolve any 
objections that were based on "alleged inaccuracies in the sentencing reports." 
Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, f 29. 
B. This Court's remand order should be limited to those objections 
that allege inaccuracies in the sentencing report. 
As noted above, Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(6) requires the trial court to 
resolve "alleged inaccuracies" in the PSI. But § 77-18-1 does not require the trial 
court to issue specific rulings where a defendant has not identified a specific 
inaccuracy in the PSI. 
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In addition, § 77-18-1 does not contemplate that a trial court must resolve an 
objection that challenges the facts of the underlying conviction. Nor could it. As 
explained by the supreme court, "'by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to 
have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives 
all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations/" 
State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, Tf 15,167 P.3d 1046 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275,1278 (Utah 1989)). 'Thus, having pleaded guilty, a defendant's only avenue 
for challenging his conviction is to claim that he did not voluntarily or intelligently 
enter his plea/7 Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, f 26, 184 P.3d 1226 (quotations and 
citation omitted). Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1 simply does not provide an 
alternative vehicle for collaterally attacking the underlying facts surrounding the 
actual crime. 
In this case, defendant's objection included 17 separately numbered objections 
to the PSI. See generally R. 138-48 (Attachment A). As set forth below, however, the 
majority of defendant's objections do not point to any alleged inaccuracies in the PSI 
and therefore should not be subject to the remand order. Specifically: 
3
 While the above cases refer to guilty pleas, defendant pleaded no contest in 
this case. Under Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-2(3) (West 2004), however, a plea of 
no contest has "the same effect" as a guilty plea. 
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• Objection 1 (R. 138-39) does not contest the fact that defendant issued a bad 
check, but instead simply explains the circumstances surrounding that fact. 
R. 138-39. This is an explanation, not a point of dispute, and it therefore is not 
subject to consideration on remand. 
• Objection 3 (R. 139-40) appears to challenge defendant's underlying guilt, 
but defendant waived the right to make that challenge by entering his plea. 
• Objections 4 & 5 (R. 140) do not cite to the PSI, let alone identify any 
inaccuracy, and these objections therefore are not subject to consideration on 
remand. 
• Objection 6 (R. 140-41) was resolved by the Amended PSI and is therefore 
not subject to reconsideration on remand. See AP&P Response: 1; Amended 
PSI: 2. 
• Objection 7 (R. 141) does not point to any inaccuracy. The challenged 
statement from the PSI is that defendant has "plac[ed] blame on his 
manager/7 R. 141. In this very objection, however, defendant specifically 
claims that: " Clearly, however, the manager was at fault/' R. 141. Given this, 
there is no alleged inaccuracy for the trial court to resolve. 
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• Objections 8 & 9 (R, 141-44) appear to challenge defendant's underlying 
guilt, but defendant waived the right to make these challenges by entering his 
plea. 
• Objection 10 (R. 144) does not point to any alleged inaccuracy in the PSI and 
therefore should not be subject to the remand order. 
• Objection 14 (R. 146) was resolved by the Amended PSI. See AP&P 
Response: 2 
• Objections 15 & 16 (R. 146-47) do not point to any alleged inaccuracy in the 
PSI and therefore should not be subject to the remand order. 
• Objection 17 (R. 147) was resolved by the Amended PSI. See AP&P 
Response: 2. 
Thus, insofar as the above objections either did not point to inaccuracies in the 
PSI, or instead challenged defendant's underlying guilt, the State requests that the 
remand order only require resolution of Objections 2,11,12, & 13. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, but remand this case for the limited 
purpose of allowing the court to resolve the alleged inaccuracies in the PSI. 
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Respectfully submitted May J2L, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
D. 
RYAN pi TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Objection to Presentence Report 
Case No. 04-1701630 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
TO ALL PARTUS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Eddie Kucharski by and through hk^ 
R Jardine* hereby objects to the Presentence Report dsited February 16,2007, for the foUowmg reasons: 
1, On page % the second ftdi paragraph, the Presentence Report indicates that Eddie Kucharski 
purchased a vehicle with a $38,000.00 bad check. Mr* K^dwski relates that in ^  he 
purchased a vehicle from Quality Dodge in Tooele, Utah. At the time he purchased the vehicle, he 
issued a check with the understanding that the check would not be cashed until Mr. Kucharski received 
funds flrom a sponsor, Eddie Kucharski is the managec/owner of H&K Motor Sports, H&K Motor 
Sports is involved in the Nascar team business, Mr, Kjucharski's business owns several different race 
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cars and teams, Mr. Kucharski believed at the time that they check was issued that he would be able to 
have the $38,000.00 within a three-week time frame because heaat ic i^ 
Honroffe~SpOTs^ teams. Mr. Kucharski was arrested while they were awaiting for the 
money to oome in from the sponsor. The car dealership understood the dynamics of this situation and 
breached his agreement by cashing the check which is why, in part, the matter was dismissed. 
2. Mr. Kucharski indicates that at the first court appearance in this matter the prosecution told 
him that they were in the process of dismissing the matter. Three weeks later, the matter was dismissed. 
The car dealer was not out any money whatsoever due to the fact that Mr, Kucharski paid him for 
depreciation on the car. The statement in the Presentence Report that the district attorney had to actually 
file fciony charges in order for the defendant to agree to return the vehicle is incorrect and inaccurate. 
3. Defendant objects to the second Ml paragraph on page 2 of the Presentence Report which 
starts " AMttide-OrientatJoq." In that paragraph, the Presentence Report indicates "The de&ndanfs 
explanation of the offense is completely contradictory to that of his victim and to the employer he 
exploited," Eddie Kucharski believes that he did not exploit his employer- This offense arose from a 
situation where Eddie Kucharski worked for Champion Windows and Patios (Champion). He agreed 
with the manager of Champion, Greg Sfauaoway, that he could do some window jobs on the side. Greg 
Shunoway agreed that Eddie Kucharski could do the window jobs with the only stipulation that they 
purchased the windows from Champion. One of the people that Eddie Kucharski agreed that he would 
do a window job for was a person by the name of Laimy Hansen who is the victim in this case- Eddie 
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Kucharski agreed with Lanny Hansen that he would do the window job for Lanny Hansen. He took a 
deposit from Lanny Hansen. He asked Greg Shunoway to order the w i n d ^ ^ 
ordered the w ind^^ install the windows in Lanny Hansen's 
home. As a result of the windows not bdtag inmaUed. L i^my Hansen 
complaint against Eddie Kucharski. Eddie Kucharski then has had to face the criminal charges. The 
employer in this matter, Champion, was not exploited. In feet, the employer wronged Eddie Kucharsld. 
4. It is Eddie Rucharstd's understanding that both he and Champion were sued as a result of the 
problem. Eddie Kucharsld was informed by Brett Klackston that Champion had actually cut a check to 
Lanny Hansen in Battlement of the matter, 
5. From the day that Eddie Kucharski received the service of a lawsuit; until the day that he was 
supposed to be sentenced last year, he indicates that be was in negotiations with the civil attorney far 
Lanny Hansen in order to resolve the matter. He offered to install windows from a different company 
and he offered to make substantial payments since he no longer had the deposit given him by Lanny 
Hansen, but nothing was ever finalized between himself and Lanny Hansen's attorney. 
6< On page 2, the second sentence of the Attitude-Orientation'' paragraph, the Presentence 
Report Investigator indicates "He claims to have 'returned the deposit* in his statement of the offense,*1 
The fact of the matter is that a careful reading of the defendant's statement of the offense could lead to 
the conclusion that when Eddie Kucharski indicated that he "returned the deposit** he was talking about 
the deposit for a different job, not the job related to the Lanny Hansen order. 
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As a matter of clearing up the Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski hereby informs the oourt that 
at the time that he took on the job for Lanny Hansen, he also took on a patio job fotApersoa^y^he^Sne-
of Greg WvUia:^ the job for Greg William* he found out that he 
couldn't get die materials through Champion. As a result of that he couldnt get the materials so at that 
point Eddie Kucharski returned &e deposit on the patio job for Greg Williams but he couldn't return the 
deposit on the window job for Lanny Hansen because Greg Shunoway was still indicating at that point 
that the windows were going to be forthcoming, but they never were. In any event, there is a statement 
in the Presentence Report that indicates he claims to have "returned the deposit/ The reality is that 
when Eddie Kucharski claims to return the deposit, he was talking about the deposit to Greg Williams 
for the patio job, not the deposit to Lanay Hansen for the window job* 
7. In the fourth sentence of the Attkud^Qrientetioa pgrftgrapk foe Pra&Bntftnaa Report 
Investigator indicates "The defendant actually tries to absolve himself from full responsibility by placing 
blame on his manager at the time/ Even in Eddie Kuchar&ld's statement, he indicates thai he feels bad, 
"I feel horrible that Lanny lost money. That was nrrver intended I am working two jobs to pay Lanny 
hack." Obviously, Eddie Kucharski is not trying to absolve himself from full responsibility by placing 
blame on the manager at the time. Clearly, however, the manager was at fault Eddie Kucharski 
indicates that the manager was fired, terminated from his job, due to the dealings that occurred with 
respect to this matter and for other similar reasons. 
8. Eddie Kucharski disputes sentence 5 of the Attifode-Qrient&tion paragraph of die Presentence 
4 
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Report which indicates that "The feet is he never submitted the work order for the windows, insisted that 
the victim issue the checks directly to himself and then cashed the cbecksj^^ 
account/Jtt^ the airangement that Eddie Kucharski had with the 
manager at the time, Greg Shunoway* he was to tell Greg that there were windows and more materials 
thai were needed, and Greg Shunoway was to order those windows or materials, Eddie Kucharski would 
then receive the materials and do the job on his own time. That was the arrangement that Eddie 
Kucharski had with his manager. It was a win-win situation for all. Champion would receive money fbr 
the materials that were ordered from them and Eddie Kucharski would make money on the side-
However, there was never an arrangement between Eddie Kucharski and the manager of the store, Greg 
Shunoway, that he would submit a work order for the windows. Tliaiwasnotpertoftheantrngemefll 
The Presentence Report makes it seem as though Ecfidic Kucharski should have issued a work order lor 
the windows* 
Of course, the victim, Lanny Hansen, was required to pay Eddie Kucharski directly for the work 
due to the fact that Eddie Kucharski was not woridng for Champion when he agreed to install the 
windows, rather he was working for himself as an independent contractor. Eddie Kucharski arranged for 
the windows and materials to be delivered from Champion and was going to perform the work himself. 
Of course, the victim was to pay him directly for the windows, Eddie Kucharski did not cash the 
payment for the windows through his personal checking account, in feet, Eddie Kucharski cashed the 
checks through Lanny Hansen's checking account He just simply cashed the checks that were delivered 
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to him by his customer. 
9. The last sentence in the ^ j J i l u ^ 
CHientationja^^ The fact of the matter is thai the defendant's 
attitude is to clearup what actuaUy occwed as ftr as the aft^^ Eddie 
Kueharslriknows and understands^ He 
knows that it was a big mistake to use the money for his personal use when he should have reserved it to 
do the job for which he was hired. He recognizes that that was one of the biggest mistakes of his life due 
to the faot that he did nm have the money to Lanny Hansen when Greg Shunoway foiled to order the 
windows and the windows were never delivered* Eddie Kucharski has now spent 87 days in jail due to 
this matter. 
The reason Eddie Kuaharski was performing side jobs is because he needed extra money because 
his son had spent two weeks in the ICU and he had a huge hospital bill to pay. Additionally, Eddie 
Kucharski was being promoted in the company he worked for at the same time of the alleged events* 
The promotion involved a move to Dallas, Texas* The move was not being paid for by the company, so 
Eddie Kucharski used the money for hospital bills and moving expenses for his family. He recognizes, 
however, that he should not have used the money for anything except for performing the work for the 
customer who had paid him in advance for his services. 
As Eddie Kucharski understands it, the work that he was going to do for Lanny Hansen was going 
to be done and that the materials were going to be paid for by Champion* Champion was going to be 
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taking money out of his paychecks for the cost of the windows. The labor thai was going to be 
accomplished would be accomplished by Eddie Kucharski, It would have onfyjaken&^ 
complete thejob 1 _____ ~~~~~~~ 
10. With respect to the paragraphs under ,!I>rVESTIGATOR COMMENT1 on page 2 of the 
Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski admits that the current wrongdoing occurred during the time that 
he was on supervised probation. He also admits that there were plans for the supervised probation to be 
terminated. In fact, the supervised probation was in fact terminated successfully. 
Eddie Kncharski did successfully complete supervised probation. The fact of the matter is that at 
the cad of 1997 through the end of 2000, he did rack up a series of criminal charges. His probation was 
revoked and reinstated twice; however» Eddie Kucharski also believes that he will certainly perform well 
on probation if he is only given the chance, Once again, his last probation did end successfully. 
11. Lanny Hansen has told Eddie Kucharski thai he is recommexidingtotheprosecntoraxidthe 
court that no additional time be served by Eddie in this matter. Mr, Hansen knew that Eddie Kucharski 
was working independently from Champion when he agreed to do the work on Lanny Hansen1* home. 
Mr. Hansen knew that was the reason he was gettixig the windows done ^ t a discounted rate. Eddie 
Kucharski did not tell Lanny Hansen that the windows were a promotional deal as indicated on page 3, 
first full paragraph, sentence 3 of the Presentence Report. He did tell Lanny Hansen that he would do 
the work cheaper than he could get the work done through Champion. The amount of $10,393.00 was 
paid to Eddie Kucharski by Lanny Hansen. 
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When Mr. Hansen contacted Eddie fcucharski, as indicated on page 3, in the first full paragraph 
of the Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski did inform Mr. Hansen thejroric^^ 
hejuid^fem^ delay was also caused by the fact that he hadn't received 
the windows from Champion yet. 
Yet, the manager of Champion, Greg Shnnoway, told Lanny Hansen that Eddie Kncharsld had 
"possibly moved to Arizona", for the probable reason that Greg Shnnoway wanted to cover up his own 
wrongdoing in the matter. As indicated above, ultimately, the manager, Greg Shunoway, was fired from 
his job for the dealings that he made in this instance as well as other instances similar to this incident 
Of course, the manager of Champion never received a work order due to the feet that the work was not 
done through Champion, it was done through Eddie KucharskL 
Eddie Kuchsrski never submitted a work order to Champion, Eddie Kucharski did give Mr. 
Hansen a document which indicated the location and measurements of windows. Apparently, Mr» 
Hansen sent that document to Champion and was infoimed that the dooiment was not valii The 
Presentence Report also indicates on page 3, the second full paragraph, the last sentence, "Evidently the 
work order had a substantial amount of missing infoxmatioa." The fact of the matter is that there was 
never a work order that was submitted to Champion by Eddie Kucharski or from Mr. Hansen to Eddie 
KucbarskL It was only a work sheet where Eddie Kucharski worked out the size of the windows and the 
prioe he would need to install the windows. 
12. With respect to the third &U paragraph on page 3 of the Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski 
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will provide documents to the court on the day of the sentencing in this matter which indicate that Eddie 
Kucharsld did not quit the company on May 27,2006. In fact, he was transfagsLlo Dallas, Texas-en-or-
about that dale. 
13. With respect to the fourth full paragraph on page 3 of the Presentence Report, Eddie 
Kucharsld never received any messages which were allegedly left by the police on his "active cell 
phone." 
14. With respect to paragraph one under "CUSTODY STATUS11 of the Presentence Report, 
defendant Berved 52 days in the Davis County Jail and an additional 30 days in Maricopa County, 
Arizona, and an additional 14 days in Tooele County on these charges. 
15- With respect to paragraph ME. PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY", the fact of the matter is 
that from 1999 through 2002, the defendant was having a very difficult time in bis life* Hewentlbrough 
a divorce and was suffering from the mental illness of bipolar disease which was untreated at the time. 
Many of the criminal offenses that are shown occurred from the same episode of criminal history, in 
other words, Eddie Kucharsld was not on probation at the time that he committed the offense EXCEPT 
for the check that was issued in 2000 and, EXCEPT offense (6) indicated on the Presentence Report 
which was committed in 2002. Eddie Kucharski is now being treated for his bipolar illness with 
medication from a psychiatrist at IDS Hospital. He also receives counseling on a monthly basis. He has 
ramarried and has two children with his current wife. In the event that Eddie Kucharski is required to 
serve any significant time in jail or prison, his current wife and children will have no way to pay for their 
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needs. 
16. With respect to the ,rVICTIM I M P A C ^ ^ 
the Presentence Report, once again, Eddie Kucharski is sony that the Hansen* lost their money. He is 
sorry that he did not keep the deposit that t b ^ He did 
believe that he was going to be able to accomplish the work for them but he was wrong. He has spoke 
with Lamty Hansen who has indicated that Lanny Hansen has no ill feelings towards Eddie Kucharski 
and that Lanny Hansen does not want to see Eddie Kucharski incarcerated for another period of time. 
17. With respect to the third to the last full paragraph, second sentence, on page 7 of the 
Presentence Report, it is indicated "The defendant also works for H&K Motor Sports in their public 
relations office." Eddie Kucharski owns H&K Motor Sports. Similarly, sentence 4 of the same 
paragraph it states "From 1997 until 2004, the defendant was employed with Compute* as a Sales 
Representative," Eddie Kucharski owned Computex and was not just a Sales Representative. Eddie 
Kucharski was making approximately $100,000.00 per year when he owned Computex, but he did 
dissolve the company to start a carter in racing cars. He believed at the time and continues to believe 
that there is much more money involved in rasing cars than there is in computers* 
DATED: Febmary 28,2007 
Attorney for Defendant 
Respectfully su 
Nathan N. Jardine 
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CERTIFICATE OF SEfrVffy. 
The imdersigned hereby certifies that on the February 2g, 2007, a true and oorrect copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Presentence Report was served by facsimile and United States First Class Mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Richard L. Larsen, Esq, 
DdYte CQUatyPrcsecttfor 
80Q West State Street 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
Lee Kenney, Investigator 
Blake Beesley, Supervisor 
Adult Probation and Parole 
Farmington A. P. & P. 
883 West 100 North 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Fax No 
Nathan N. Jardine 




Utah Department of Corrections 
Adult Probation and Parole 
WILLIAM H FOWLKE 
Division Director 
Region III 
BRENT CARD ALL 
Regional Administrator 
March 5, 2007 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Re: KUCHARSKI, Eddie 
Case#: 041701630 
Sentencing Date: March 8, 2007 
Prosecuting Attorney: Steve Major 
Defense Attorney: Nathan Jardine 
From: Lee Kenney, Investigator 
Your Honor, 
This memorandum is being submitted in response to Defense Attorney Nathan Jardine's Objection to the 
Presentence Investigation Report. There appears to be 17 objections, each response is numerical noted below. 
1) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, no change in the report. 
2) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, charges were filed and defendant spent 14 days 
in jail which is sufficient explanation, no change in the report. 
3) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, no change in the report. 
4) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, Champion Windows was sued in civil court as 
the result of the defendant's criminal behavior, no change in the report. 
5) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, no change in the report. 
6) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, the report now reads, "At no time did the 
defendant make any attempt to return the deposit to the victim in this case." 
7) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, no change in the report. 
8) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, the method the defendant used to cash the checks 
in either case was illegal. In addition, please refer to the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, 
specifically 58-55-501, subsection 1. Defense Council now claims the defendant was operating as an 
"independent contractor." The only license the defendant has held in this state is no longer valid and was 
for an "Unarmed Private Security Officer." The Utah Department Commerce verified and no time was the 
defendant license to operate as an "independent contractor," which would require a Contractor's License. 
36W Fremont Ave , Salt Lake City, UT 84101-3101 • telephone (801) 239-2100 • fax (801) 239-2224 • www con ections Utah gov 
State of Utah 
HOMAS PATTERSON 
Executive Du ectoi 
HRISTINE MITCHELL 
Deputy Du ectoi 
This investigator would like to refer the defendant and his council to 58-55-503, subsection 1 These are 
the criminal penalties for acting as an "independent contractor," without a Contractor's License Be 
careful what you claim, as it may constitute a separate criminal act It is recommended the defendant and 
his council contact the Utah Department of Commerce should they need this explained m detail 
9) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, no change m the report 
10) Defendant/Defense Council's opimon, objection noted, report indicates his three penods of probation were 
terminated successfully, no change in the leport 
11) Defendant/Defense Council's opimon, objection noted, see police report, no change in the report 
12) Defendant/Defense Council's opimon, objection noted, no change in the leport 
13) So was the defendant working for Champion Windows or not7 Defense Council's objection 
would now infer the defendant was working for Champion Windows One must be employed to be 
"transferred " 
14) Mancopa County Jail was contacted and indicated the defendant was booked into their jail on August 20, 
2006 He remained in custody until released for transportation and received at the Davis County Jail on 
September 12, 2006 The defendant was released from the Davis County Jail on November 3, 2006, after 
serving a cumulative total of 75 days He was released to the Tooele County Jail for the criminal charge of 
Issuing Bad Check, a Second Degree Felony His incarceration in Tooele County had nothing to do with 
the defendant's current conviction and he w as released "O R " The report has been changed and is 
recommending the defendant be granted ci edit foi time served of 75 days 
15) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, no change in the report 
16) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, no change m the report. 
17) Defendant/Defense Council's opinion, objection noted, report changed to reflect defendant's lequest 
In closing, changes to the Presentence Investigation Report have been bolded for simplicity The defendant's 
criminal history also has one addition On December 12, 2006, the defendant vs as charged with 
Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony. He is schedule for an Initial Appearance on March 
12, 2007. 
It is further recommended theie be no further delay in sentencing Should there be further objections, it is 
asked that the Court take them into consideration but proceed with sentencing A representative from Adult 
Probation and Parole can answer any questions, of relevance, Defense Council may have 
Blake Beesley. Supervisor f \ 
Court Services Unit ^s-/ 
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